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THE SCHOOL OF LAW
Professor Tyrrell Williams has completed his work in connec-
tion with the preparation of Missouri Annotations to the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Contracts.
Professor Israel Treiman is now engaged in the conduct of an
investigation into the practice in receivership suits in the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis. This work is under the joint aus-
pices of the St. Louis Bar Association and of Washington Uni-
versity. Its purpose is to collect statistics to determine how re-
ceivership suits are actually handled in the local courts.
Notes
HOLDING COMPANY REGULATION THROUGH THE
STATUTORY INHIBITION AGAINST STOCK
ACQUISITION
Utility holding company regulation has become in recent years
a focal point for public interest and discussion. The Insull de-
bacle and other failures have raised a hue and cry for regulation
that is seemingly irresistible. What reflection this clamor will
find in the opinions of the public service commissions and courts
throughout the country cannot yet be told. It is to be expected
however that the almost unbelievable multiplication of utility
holding companies will not be repeated. The Supreme Court of
Missouri has very recently said that it is against the public policy
of Missouri to allow foreign holding companies to acquire more
than ten per cent. of the capital stock of a local utility.1
1 Not yet reported, decided Sept. 18, 1932. Rehearing denied January,
1933.
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Opportunity for the articulation of public sentiment is pre-
sented in the interpretation of statutes requiring commission con-
sent to the acquisition of stock in gas, electric, and street railway
corporations by utilities operating in the same field and/or stock
corporations, foreign or domestic.
These statutes in general are of two distinct types. There is
first the statute which is found in Illinois. "With the consent and
approval of the commission, a public utility may acquire, take or
hold stock, stock certificates, bonds, notes, or other evidence of in-
debtedness of another public utility." 2  In State Public Utility
Commission ex rel. Clow v. Romberg,3 the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois held that this statute did not violate the prohibition in the
Illinois Constitution against monopolies. The Romberg case is
of further interest in that it approves the acquisition of stock in
an Illinois utility by American Telegraph and Telephone Co. and
one of its subsidiaries in the face of a statute 4 which forbids a
transfer to a foreign corporation of the right to own, operate,
manage, or control a "public utility", the court saying that "pub-
lic utility" means the physical plant itself which the local company
still owns, in spite of a contrary definition contained in a previous
section.5 This decision would seem to indicate that under no pos-
sible construction could such a statute apply to holding com-
panies.6 Therefore states having statutes regulating acquisition
of utility stock by utilities are without any such regulation over
holding companies. 7
2 R. S. Ill. (Cahill 1927) ch. lilA, sec. 27, Ind. Ann. St. (Burns 1926)
sec. 12767 is of substantially similar purport, and further, "no corporation
foreign or domestic operating a public utility shall purchase, acquire, take
or hold, directly or indirectly more than 10% of the total capital stock" of
domestic utilities. District of Columbia, Act of March 4, 1913, P. A. No. 435,
sec. 11, N. J. Laws 1911 ch. 195, sec. 19. Many other states have similar
statutes.
3(1917) 275 Ill. 432, 114 N. E. 191. Although the constitutionality of
this statute has not otherwise been questioned so far as this writer is aware,
the enormity and exclusive nature of American Telegraph & Telephone Co.(which was involved in the Romberg case) indicates that the other courts of
the nation are in agreement.
4R. S. Ill. (Cahill 1927) ch. 111 A sec. 28.
5 Sec. 10 defines a public utility as every corporation, company, association,
etc., engaged in certain businesses, gas, electric, etc.
6 New York-New Jersey Superpower Connecting Corp. v. Public Service
Commission (1926) 215 App. Div. 578, 214 N. Y. S. 294; Re Tri-State Con-
solidated Telephone Co. (Minn. R. R. 1931) P. U. R. 1932 A, 397; Re Utilities
Power and Light Co. (Mo. P. S. C. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 B, 354.
7 Re Madison Light and Power Co. (Ind. P. S. C. 1924) P. U. R. 1924 C,
517; Re Eastport Water Co. (Mo. P. S. C. 1929) P. U. R. 1929 E, 136;
Borough of Brookville v. Solar Electric Co. (Pa. P. S. C. 1928) P. U. R. 1928
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Yet, under a statute similar in purport to the Illinois law, but
couched in negative terms, the Maryland Commission reached an
opposite conclusion." A local holding company possessed a char-
ter authorizing it to perform the functions of a gas company. It
owned the stock of a foreign corporation which in turn owned the
stock of a local operating company. The local holding company
applied for permission to issue and sell new stock to a Delaware
holding company which owned all its previously issued stock. It
was held that all the stock owning companies involved were par-
ticipants in control of the gas plant of the local operating company
and were therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the commission
as gas corporations; "control can also be predicated of any Mary-
land gas corporation in an interconnected series of gas corpora-
tions that by reason of interlocking stock ownerships is capable
of either originating or passing on a corporate movement which
eventually asserts a directing influence over the workings of a gas
plant within the state of Maryland." A further interpretation is
found in Re Bangor Railway and Electric Co.,9 in which the Maine
Commission allowed the transfer of stock of a Maine corporation
formed as a holding company for Maine utilities, saying that al-
though the company is not strictly a public utility, the commission
will so treat it for this purpose. Of all the various holdings set
out, this last has most to recommend itself. In reviewing the
events of the past decade the necessity of some form of control
over the purchase of utility stock by holding companies appears
obvious. The Bangor method is forthright, simple, and cannot
B, 612, allowed a sale of stock to an individual in the interest of a non-resi-
dent holding company also owning the stock of another resident utility which
was previously refused permission to buy the stock in question; Re Washing-
ton Gas Light Co. (D. C. P. U. C. 1932) P. U. R. 1932 D, 47. Likewise, in
absence of a statute, Re San Jose R. R. (Cal. R. R. C. 1917) P. U. R. 1917 C,
939.
8 Md. Code Ann. (Bagby 1924) art. 23, sec. 394; Re Central Public Service
Corporation (1929) P. U. R. 1930 A, 32. It will be noted that in thus in-
creasing its potency, the commission did not do so by disregarding entities
or by any other indirect means, it simply interpreted the statute according to
the literal meaning of its words. The former means was employed in an
Ohio rate case decided in 1922. Ohio Mining Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission (1922) 106 Ohio St. 138, 140 N. E. 143. Too much reliance should
not be placed on this case in view of the ease with which this result was
evaded, i. e. by merely transferring the stock of the local company to the
holding company's stockholders. Southern Ohio Power Co. v. Public Util-
ities Commission (1924) 110 Ohio St. 246, 143 N. E. 700.9 (Me. P. U. C. 1925) P. U. R. 1925 E, 705. See also for a variety of hold-
ings with the same trend: Re Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. (Conn. P. S. C. 1916)
P. U. R. 1917 D, 271; Re Continental Gas and Electric Corporation (Neb.
R. R. C. 1926) P. U. R. 1926 D, 711.
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adequately be contested save on the ground of expediency, which
argument is answered by our tragic experience with unregulated
holding companies.
The other type of statute referred to supra is one which ex-
pressly declares that no stock corporation, foreign or domestic,
may acquire more than a specified percentage, usually ten per
cent., of the capital stock of a local utility without the approval of
the commission. The Missouri provision is typical.
No railroad corporation, or electrical corporation, domestic
or foreign, shall hereafter purchase or acquire, take or hold,
any part of the capital stock of any railroad corporation or
street railroad corporation or other common carrier organ-
ized or existing under or by virtue of the laws of this state
unless authorized so to do by the commission; and save where
stock shall be transferred or held for the purpose of collateral
security, no stock corporation of any description, domestic or
foreign, other than a railroad corporation, street railroad
corporation, or electrical corporation, shall, without the con-
sent of the Commission, purchase or acquire, take or hold,
more than ten per centum of the total capital stock issued by
any railroad corporation or street railroad corporation or
other common carrier organized or existing under or by vir-
tue of the laws of this state, except that a corporation now
lawfully holding a majority of the stock of any railroad cor-
poration or street railroad corporation may with the consent
of the commission acquire and hold the remainder of the
capital stock of such railroad corporation, or street railroad
corporation or any portion thereof. Nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed to prevent the holding of stock here-
tofore lawfully acquired, or to prevent, upon the surrender
or exchange of said stock pursuant to a reorganization plan,
the purchase, acquisition, taking or holding of a proportion-
ate amount of stock of any new corporation organized to take
over, at foreclosure or other sale, the property of any cor-
poration whose stock has been thus surrendered or ex-
changed. Every contract, assignment, transfer or agreement
for transfer of any stock by or through any person or corpo-
ration to any corporation in violation of any provision of this
act shall be void and of no effect, and no such transfer or as-
signment shall be made upon the books of any such railroad
corporation or street railroad corporation, or shall be recog-
nized as effective for any purpose.1o
10 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5177; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5195 (applying to gas,
electric, and water companies), R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5219 (applying to tele-
phone companies). C. S. N. Y. (Cahill 1930) ch. 49 sec. 70. Massachusetts
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This type of statute is of especial significance today. It is one
of the few regulatory instruments specifically relating to holding
companies. 1  How effective its enforcement has been, and the
questions arising thereunder for determination are matters of
grave importance in the formulation of future guide-posts by the
light of the mourning candles of our past experience.
An interesting and unique question of construction and inter-
pretation arose in New York in 1928. The local company had a
capitalization of 10,000 shares of voting common stock and 90,000
shares of non-voting preferred stock. The particular sub-hold-
ing company involved already held 5,400 shares of the common
stock, which gave voting control of the local company, but was less
than 10% of the total outstanding stock. It had acquired this
without the consent of the commission. It now applied for per-
mission to acquire the rest of the common stock and the entire
issue of preferred stock. The commission refused to allow the
sub-holding company to acquire it, declaring that it had violated
the statute in the first instance; that the statute by any reasonable
construction is not limited to 10% of the total capital stock in its
literal meaning, but was intended to relate to actual control, and
therefore the sale of -voting stock was limited to 10%.12 On ap-
peal the Supreme Court 13 reversed the commission, saying that
the limitation refers to total capital stock, and voting power does
not affect the question; that "public policy is not involved if there
has been compliance with the law." This case materially weakens
the power of the statute considered. If a holding company hav-
ing control over a utility can obtain permission to change its capi-
tal structure and limit the numbers of shares bearing voting
power to an amount twenty per cent. or less of its total capital
structure, it has the right to convey a controlling interest to ai-
other system without commission approval, thus removing from
commission jurisdiction entirely the question of expediency in
holding company control. The difficulty of any other construc-
tion, however, is manifest in view of the clear and unequivocal ex-
pression of the statute.
One of the most troublesome questions raises an issue of funda-
mental policy. Is consolidation or acquisition of a controlling
has the same type of statute except that the legislature must approve. G. L.
Mass. (1921) ch. 156, sec. 5; Md. Code Ann. (Bagby 1924) art. 23, see. 394.
11 Bonbright and Means, "The Holding Company" (1932), 206; Lilienthal,
Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 404;
note (1932) 45 Harv. L. R. 732.
22 P. U. R. 1928 D, 247.
13 New York State Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission
(1929) 227 App. Div. 18, 236 N. Y. S. 411.
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stock interest1 4 to be approved if it shall appear that it would
have no detrimental effect on the public interest, or shall it be re-
fused unless it appears that the public interest will be benefited
thereby?
There is a clear split of authority on the point, with perhaps
the majority of the states holding to the negative test in the inter-
ests of preserving the integrity of private property. 5 This posi-
tion is admirably indicated in a series of Maryland cases. In
1927, an application was filed by a Delaware holding company to
acquire the stock of four Maryland utilities at a price in excess
of the reproduction cost of the property represented by the stock
by some $245,000.00. The stock acquired was to be pledged with
other stock of the applicant as collateral on a proposed bond is-
sue of $4,000,000.00. The Commission refused its approval be-
cause it could not see any advantage to the public.1 6 This was
affirmed by the Circuit Court, but reversed on appeal to the Mary-
land Court of Appeals which said:
In the case of an owner of the stock of such a company is it
within the rule of reason to hold that he may not sell his stock
to a corporation unless it can be shown that the public will
be benefited by the sale? Or may permission be refused
merely because the only consideration moving the parties is
one of financial investment which the parties believe to be for
their mutual advantage? We think not. . . . To prevent
injury of the public in the clashing of private interestwiththe
public good in the operation of public utilities is one of the
most important functions of Public Service Commissions.
It is not their province to insist that the public shall be bene-
fited as a condition to change of ownership, but their duty is
to see that no such change shall be made as would work to the
14 If the local management is friendly, and the voting stock wide-spread,
10% of the voting stock will be sufficient for ordinary working control. A
few of the larger holding systems now work upon this principle and concen-
trate on minority holdings. In any event the legislatures evidently con-
sidered 10% as giving such influence as to be potentially harmful.
5 Re Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co. (Minn. P. U. C. 1916) P. U. R.
1916 D, 534; Re General Waterworks and Electric Corp. (Ala. P. S. C. 1929)
P. U. R. 1930 A, 354; Re Raymond-Webbs Mills Telephone Co. (Me. P. U. C.
1916) P. U. R. 1916 F, 749; Re Concord Gaslight Co. (N. H. P. U. C. 1921)
P. U. R. 1921 C, 169; Re Franklin Light & Power Co. (N. H. P. U. C. 1928)
P. U. R. 1929 D, 678. There is some uncertainty in Indiana. Re Winona
Telephone Co. (Ind. P. S. C. 1927) P. U. R. 1928 B, 829 (no detriment); Re
Associated Telephone Co. (Ind. P. S. C. 1927) P. U. R. 1927 C, 577 (must
show benefit to the public).
16 Re Electric Public Utilities Co. P. U. R. 1927 E, 609.
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public detriment. In the public interest in such cases can
reasonably mean no more than not detrimental to the pub-
lic.17
The case was remanded to the commission which again refused
the transfer on the ground that it would be detrimental to the
public interest. This was reversed by the Circuit Court which
held that the consolidation of public utilities cannot be denied by
the commission on grounds of over-capitalization or excessive
purchase price for controlling stock as being detrimental in view
of the complete jurisdiction of the commission both as to rates
and services of the operating company.' s It is readily seen that
the effectiveness of the Maryland statute is thus to a large meas-
ure, if not entirely, eliminated since the collapse of holding com-
pany structure which has occurred in recent years may be traced
in no small measure to excessive prices paid for stock of local
companies.' 9
The other and better rule requiring the showing of public bene-
fit is found in Missouri, New York, Illinois, Nebraska, and pos-
sibly California.20 Which rule should be followed depends largely
on the fundamental conception of the proper office and functions
of the public utility in the social arrangement, i. e. whether utili-
ties are operated in the interests of the public primarily, and from
which private profits may be made, or whether they are primarily
private enterprises. Following a line of cases which had involved
the purchase of assets,2 ' the Alleghany Corporation (one of the
Van Sweringen holding companies) was allowed to acquire the
controlling stock of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, with-
out making any showing that such acquisition would be in the
public interest. The commission said, "In the absence of a show-
17 Electric Public Utilities Co. v. West (1928) 154 Md. 445, 140 Atl. 840.
1s Electric Public Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission (1928)
P. U. R. 1928 E, 854.
19 Perhaps the most powerful factor contributing to the downfall of cer-
tain holding companies may be termed a faulty balance of the "financial
lever". This is not properly "overcapitalization," but is a dangerous form
of capitalization. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (1927).
20 Re Consolidated Gas Co. (N. Y. P. S. C. 1928) P. U. R. 1928 E, 19; Re
East Bay Water Co. (Cal. R. R. C. 1928) P. U. R. 1929 A, 620; Re Continental
Gas & Electric Corp. (Neb. R. R. C. 1926) P. U. R. 1926 D, 711; Re Chicago
Tunnel Co. (Ill. Com. C. 1916) P. U. R. 1916 E, 268.
21 Re Kansas City Telephone Co. (1927) P. U. R. 1927 C, 101; Re Liberal
Light & Power Co. (1930) P. U. R. 1930 B, 282. For many purposes the
purchase of assets and the purchase of stock may involve dissimilar prob-
lems, but in the consideration of what is fundamentally a general rule of
policy, cases involving the purchase of assets are quite as informative as the
others.
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ing that such acquisition of stock would be detrimental to the
public, it is the duty of the commission to grant the prayer of the
applicant." 2 2 In all of these cases, however, the commission il-
logically inserted in the formal order, a clause to the effect that
the transaction is in the public interest. In 1929, however, when
a Delaware holding company sought to acquire the stock of the
St. Louis Public Service Company, the commission was thoroughly
consistent in saying that, "the basis of our decision should be, is
such transfer detrimental, injurious, or harmful to the public
and the public welfare." 23 This case went up on appeal by the
City of St. Louis, and minority stockholders to the Supreme Court
of Missouri which handed down its decision in September, 1932,
and only recently denied a motion for a rehearing.2 4 The Court
reversed the commission, and, after reviewing the Public Service
Act as an entirety, declared that the whole tenor of the Act and
its very purpose was to afford not only protection in existing con-
ditions to the public, but to insure to it a benefit, and in the absence
of a showing of such benefit, there exists no reason for approval
of a change in the status quo. Several writers have indicated that
this controversy really centers about a distinction without a dif-
ference, and that it is of little practical importance. However,
under the Maryland holding cited supra, it is to be noted that the
commission must give its approval in the absence of a finding of
detriment. This places the burden on an already overworked
commission to investigate independently and prove to its own
satisfaction the absence of possible injury. Naturally, the heav-
ily taxed commission 25 cannot consider the question with thor-
oughness, and the tendency is to disregard important factors if
not introduced by the applicant who will not reveal them if con-
trary to his interest. Under the New York and Missouri hold-
ing, the petitioner must show affirmatively that the public will be
benefited; this relieves the commission and places the responsi-
bility of showing benefit on him who must give that benefit. The
adoption of this interpretation might conceivably reduce the pos-
sibility of an unforeseen calamity.
It is possible that under a proper administration of the statute
under consideration requiring the approval of the commission of
a transfer of stock, the uneconomic placement of controlled utili-
22 Re Alleghany Corporation (1930) P. U. R. 1930 D, 47.
N Re City Utilities Co. (1929) 17 Mo. P. S. C. 265.
24 See note 1 supra.
25 Of course, it is quite possible that local public officials would take this
burden upon themselves willingly. The commission could make and enforce
a rule that they should be notified. How effectual this would be is question-
able, for in all probability the public officials would not be as passionately
zealous of their interests as are the utility advocates now.
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ties would have been prevented in the past. The commissions
have rarely, however, interfered in this matter, leaving the pre-
rogative in the hands of those business men whose driving impulse
is accumulation of profits, rather than possessing themselves of
this privilege with a view to public efficiency. They are prone to
approve a plan which apparently affords some betterment of ex-
isting method, although that plan proposed is not the best pos-
sible. 20 It is only fair, however, to add that the commissions are
not entirely to blame, for it is certainly beyond their power under
this or any other statute to say that one particular holding com-
pany more favorably situated shall acquire, or to order such
acquisition. The most that they can do is to refuse the acquisition
by a holding company, less favorably situated, and this is utterly
inconsistent with human tendency to grasp at some benefit for
fear of losing all. Notwithstanding this there have happened
those rare instances where commissions have exercised their pre-
rogative in planting the seed for ultimate public good by refusing
to approve geographically uneconomic consolidations. In Re
Genesee Valley Gas Company Incorporated, the commission said,
It is true that the commission has granted a number of
petitions having for their purpose the expansion of existing
systems and better coordination of different operating util-
ities. In all these cases the properties acquired have either
formed a logical unit or have extended such units. The pres-
ent proposition does not come within this class of cases. The
Ticonderoga Company is remote from other properties of the
petitioner, and the only consideration seems to be one of fi-
nancial investment. We do not see how the public interest
is to be served thereby and therefore this petition is to be
denied.27
There are other cases tending along the same lines.2 8 On a re-
lated subject, the commissions have refused the sale and purchase
of utility property because it might provide an obstacle for
municipal acquisition.29
Perhaps the most controversial question, arising under con-
solidation statutes, is centered about the payment of excessive
prices in the purchase of utility stock. In the situation where a
2 6 In re Cumberland County Power and Light Co. (Me. P. U. C. 1916)
P. U. R. 1917 C, 274; contra, Re Ridgefield Electric Company (N. Y. P. S. C.
1925) P. U. R. 1925 D, 328.
27 (N. Y. P. S. C. 1926) P. U. R. 1927 B, 600.
28 Re Pennsylvania Water Service Co. (Pa. P. S. C. 1927) P. U. R. 1927 E,
656; Re Interstate Utilities Co. (Mich. P. U. C. 1928) P. U. R. 1922 C, 539.
29 Re M. A. Erickson (N. D. P. U. C. 1927) P. U. R. 1927 C, 861; Re Cam-
bridge Gas Light Co. (Mass. P. S. C. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 D. 263.
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holding company seeks to purchase the stock of an operating com-
pany, and to pay therefor a price in excess of the fair value of the
stock, the natural expectation (commissions insisting as they do,
that they have no jurisdiction over the holding company), would
be a complete disregard by the commissions of this factor on the
theory that for the purpose of rate-fixing and supervision over
service the commission did not lose jurisdiction over the physical
property of the local company and the capitalization of the hold
ing company would be of no consequence in protecting consumers.
Strangely enough only a few cases give their approval to payment
of high prices, and this only where a rate reduction appears immi-
nent because of a technological improvement. 30 On the other
hand, a considerable number of cases refuse to allow the holding
company to pay grossly excessive prices in an evident attempt to
protect not only the consumer but the investor as well.31 A rep-
resentative instance is the case of Re Metropolitan Edison Com-
pany32 in which the petitioner sought to acquire from a Delaware
holding company the stock of eleven Pennsylvania operating
companies, the purchase price agreed on being the cost to the
holding company plus interest from the date of acquisition by the
holding company to the date of approval by the commission. The
price thus computed would be in the aggregate 1.3 times the book
equity after reflecting appraised values. The commission held
that inflated costs should not be placed as a burden upon either
the public or the operating company.
Admitting that gross overcapitalization affects the investing
public adversely, and waiving the question of whether or not com-
missions should regard it as their duty to protect investors, what
deleterious effect can the capitalization of a holding company have
upon the consumers? It is true that the operating property is
still subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, and that no
amount of capitalization by the company owning its stock equities
will increase the value of the property itself so as to allow a rate
increase; nor can the service be impaired, the commission still
having jurisdiction. The effect upon rates must therefore be
- Re Columbia Gas & Electric Corp. (N. Y. P. S. C. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 B,
472; Re Great Lakes Utilities Corp. (N. Y. P. S. C. 1927) P. U. R. 1927 E,
409; Re Power & Electric Securities Co. (N. Y. P. S. C. 1925) P. U. R. 1926 A,
855; Electric Public Utilities Co. v. West (1928) 154 Md. 445, 140 Atl. 840.
31 Re Columbia Gas & Electric Corp. (N. Y. P. S. C. 1931) P. U. R. 1931 C,
247; Re Niagara Hudson Power Corp. (N. Y. P. S. C. 1932) P. U. R. 1932 C,
486; Re Niagara Hudson Power Corp. (N. Y. P. S. C. 1931) P. U. R. 1931 B,
343; Re New York Power & Light Corp. (N. Y. P. S. C. 1928) P. U. R. 1928
E, 721; Re Pennsylvania Public Service Corp. (Pa. P. S. C. 1925) P. U. R.
1926 B, 791; Re Northern Light & Power Co. (N. Y. P. S. C. 1923) P. U. R.
1924 B, 813.
;2 Re Metropolitan Edison Co. (Pa. P. S. C. 1927) P. U. R. 1927 E, 639.
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indirect, subtle, evasive. It is conjecturable that a commission
having before it a top-heavy holding company structure with a
large amount of fixed obligations would hesitate before lowering
the rates of the subsidiary. There is, however, a noxious effect
more certain to occur. It is considered good business policy to
reduce prices for the sake of an ultimate increase in profits re-
sulting from stimulated usage and mass distribution. The same
profitable possibility exists in the utility field, and a good many
companies have made beneficial use of this principle. Where,
however, the operating company is under pressure to feed the
avaricious interest and dividend seekers of a parent companywith
an inflated capital structure, this principle cannot be practiced, 33
and the management must refrain from lowering rates in circum-
stances where a conservatively capitalized company could take the
plunge with a view to future increased returns.
The consumers may also be affected with regard to service
rendered. It is not to be expected that the service of electric, gas,
and traction companies have reached their final state of perfec-
tion. There should, and undoubtedly will be, constant progress in
the development of new improvements and extensions. The
operating company would inevitably be prohibited from making
any improvements not yielding an immediate and large profit.34
83 As a matter of practice, this is not entirely true. If the utility has a
number of large consumers, it can for the purpose of stimulating business
and enjoying a "long-run" profit put into effect "block rates". This merely
means that to those increasing their consumption a certain amount, the
company offers lower rates on a sliding scale. This the local company may
do without in any way causing an immediate drain on its resources.
34 In re Wisconsin Utilities Co. (Wis. R. R. C. 1923) P. U. R. 1923 B, 855,
operating company sought to mortgage its property for purpose of securing
bonds to be issued by a foreign holding company-denied. This is an ex-
ample of the ill effects which a weak parent may have on its subsidiary.
Far from being a tower of financial strength, it sometimes must borrow from
the underlying companies. Re Green Mountain Power Corporation (Vt.
P. U. C. 1931) P. U. R. 1932 A, 130; Re Arizona Edison Co. (Ariz. Corp. C.
1931) P. U. R. 1932 A, 238. Mr. Bonbright indicates in "The Holding Com-
pany", p. 180, what part the service contract may play in mulcting a sub-
sidiary. See Re New York State Railways (N. Y. P. S. C. 1932) P. U. R.
1932 D, 479. However, this situation would afford no means of permanently
helping a financially embarrassed holding company in a time of depression.
In the absence of a rate increase ordered by the commission, which is un-
likely, an increase in service charges would be of no avail. Such funds must
come out of surplus which could otherwise be used to pay dividends on the
common stock of the subsidiary which the holding company owns. If there
is no such surplus, then such charges will merely hasten a default on the
senior securities of the subsidiary which will oust the holding company's
control and will destroy the value of common stock, which is usually the hold-
ing company's sole interest in the subsidiary.
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Thus it will be seen, that there are very real dangers attendant
upon the sanction of purchase prices largely in excess of the value
of the property indirectly to be controlled; it is gratifying to note
that the more recent decisions have not only been aware of them,
but have thwarted them.
In view of the vast, national character of the great holding com-
pany systems of America, a last question of interpretation be-
comes a matter of grave importance, in the determination of
whether or not the legislatures of states having the "ten per cent."
statutes were laying down a primary policy directed against the
foreign holding company by which to guide the commissions. It
is surprising that the expediency of allowing foreign stock cor-
porations to acquire local utility stock has been so infrequently
questioned and so uncertainly adjudicated. The Supreme Court
of Missouri has determined that public policy as indicated by the
statute in question and others opposes holding company acquisi-
tion, especially foreign holding company acquisition.35
In New York where the statute is substantially similar, the
state of the law is uncertain, and there has been vacillation from
one point of view to the other since 1917, when the case of South
Shore Natural Gas and Fuel Company36 was decided by the com-
mission. It held that the stock of three gas corporations might
be acquired by a Delaware holding company which Henry Doherty
and Company held an option to purchase. It decided that the
commission's power of management over the properties was not
lessened. A dissenting commissioner called attention to the fact
that because the commission would have no jurisdiction over the
capital issues of the foreign corporation, it thereby would lose
supervision over the security issues of the domestic companies;
that the purpose of the statute was to inhibit holding companies
and prevent the exploitation of the utility field. He, however,
gave no attention whatsoever to the increased difficulty of regu-
lation as to expenses by reason of intercorporate contracts relat-
ing to services.. In the case of Re Power and Electric Securities
Company, the majority in approving the transfer of stock to a
foreign holding company, said that the ownership of stock gives
no advantage to the holding company in the fixation of rates,
nevertheless it has misgivings because it possesses no jurisdiction
over the issuance of stocks. "When it is possible to secure earn-
ings to justify prices paid for operating utilities, represented in
the capital issues of these holding companies no harm is done, but
there are possibilities of great future loss to the investing public
because of the unregulated power of such holding companies to
issue their securities and because of the misapprehension of the
investing public with regard to those securities," calling attention
115 See note 1 supra. 36 P. U. R. 1917 C, 274.
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to the failure of the legislature to provide for the regulation of
capital issues of holding companies which control domestic util-
ities.37
The court in New York State Electric Corp. v. P. S. C.38 indi-
cated that to prevent a foreign company acquiring control is un-
reasonable since the operating company is subject to the reg-
ulatory powers of the commission. There was a dissenting opin-
ion which stressed the loss of control effected by the acquisition by
the Delaware holding company. Here then we find a holding by
a court of law in direct opposition to the decision of the Missouri
Supreme Court. It is to be noted in this connection that the Mis-
souri court in emphasizing especially the undesirability of foreign
holding companies, did not fail to indicate that it also did not
look with favor upon domestic holding companies. Had this not
been done, it would, of course, have been possible to avoid entirely
the objections of the court by interposing a domestic holding com-
pany between the utility, and the foreign corporation. This
would only serve to increase the indirection and uncertainty al-
ready attendant upon the system as it now stands. Commissions
would have no greater control over the stock issued by domestic
holding companies since they are not normally included in the
category of public utilities than it would over the issue of a for-
eign company. The factor of access to the books of a domestic
holding company and its availability for service of process con-
stitute the only effectual and material difference between it and a
foreign company not amenable to jurisdiction. Even this is
minimized to a certain extent by difficulties caused when the
books of the domestic company are not kept within the state. The
Missouri court then pursued its course logically and consistently.
The New York commission which follows the same course as does
the Missouri court with reference to foreign stock corporations,
did not object, however, to the domestic holding company.
In 1931 the New York Commission denied an application by a
foreign company to purchase utility stock using these words:
The Columbia Gas and Electric Corporation is a foreign
holding corporation over which the commission has little if
any jurisdiction or control. It has been stated by those ap-
pearing for foreign holding corporations that inasmuch as
the commission had jurisdiction and control of the operating
company it was of little interest who owned or held the stock.
We believe that this is a fallacious theory, and that the prac-
37 (1925) P. U. R. 1926 A, 855. See, however, Erie Power Corporation
(1925) P. U. R. 1926 A, 707; Re Brooklyn Union Gas Co. (1930) P. U. R.
1930 D, 255.
38 See note 13 supra.
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tical working out of such acquisition is not in all cases favor-
able to the public interest. It is difficult for the commission
where the holding company is a foreign corporation to trace
and ascertain the justice and equitableness of intercompany
charges and transactions. . .However we believe that it is
not for the best interest of the public that the stock of domes-
tic operating companies be acquired by foreign corporate
holding companies. 39
Excepting to the omission of domestic holding companies by the
commission, the writer otherwise thoroughly agrees with it.
In imposing this statutory limitation upon stock sale and
acquisition the legislature undoubtedly meant that before grant-
ing approval, the commission should inquire most diligently into
the expediency of the transaction from the standpoint of public
welfare, not from the standpoint of the feasibility of great private
gain without appreciable and obvious public detriment. And
even if the legislature had no such intention it should be the policy
of the commissions which are within the hearing of the tre-
mendous furore now surrounding holding companies to proceed
with care lest the public be further injured.
It is felt by several writers of distinction that the type of
statute under discussion is largely ineffective. "The most that
can possibly be said for it is that it is a little better than noth-
ing."40 It is true of course, that the statute has no retroactive
effect; but is it true that under the statute, the commissions have
no control over consolidations which have proven harmful both to
the public and to investors? The statute supra reads, "No stock
corporation ..... .shall, without the consent of the commis-
sion, purchase or acquire, take or hold more than ten per
centum. . ." In this word, hold, the author believes, lies a pos-
sible panacea for the evils which have resulted in certain in-
stances. Is it not feasible that under this wording, and in the
absence of other regulation on the holding company, a commis-
sion may hail before it a utility not operating successfully, de-
mand it to divulge its shareholders, and upon ascertaining that
a holding company not desirable from the standpoint of economy
and efficiency holds more than ten per cent. of the stock, order
that the holding company appear before it to obtain its approval
to a further holding of the stock? If the holding company fails
to establish facts showing a benefit to the public, there appears to
be no reason, save a fear of being accused of temerity, why the
39 See note 31 supra.
40 Bonbright and Means, "The Holding Company" (1932) 215; Lili-
enthal, Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies (1929), 29 Columbia
L. Rev. 404; note (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 732.
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commission may not order a surrender or disposal of the stock
held in excess of ten per cent. by the holding company. Naturally
this could not apply to stock acquired before the statute was en-
acted, but it is an historical fact that most holding companies
grew up after that date. Such a construction of the statute has
never been attempted. It is submitted that, with public opinion
in its present state, such an attempt in the near future might and
should be received favorably by the courts.
To admit the statute's ineffectiveness at the present time how-
ever, as even a partial remedy to the ills of holding company con-
trol can hardly be avoided. Yet this statute has other teeth which
should they be furnished up and utilized, would prove a very
definite clamp on the cauldron of parent subsidiary relationships.
Courts and commissions should keep in mind the danger of an un-
bridled holding company. The most stringent tests should be
employed. Public benefit must be the overwhelming factor in
passing approval upon a foreign holding company. Under this
should be considered exhaustively not only purchase price, and the
imminence of rate reductions, but the financial set-up of the hold-
ing company itself, its capacity to render valuable services, and
its desire to render them at cost, further and most important to
the future development of this quasi-public industry must be con-
sidered a proper and schematic territorial integration with a con-
sequent elimination of the widely scattered and resultantly weak
tentacles with which some of the holding systems now operate.
With an increasing use of conditions imposed to fortify these
ends upon the granting of applications and petitions,41 this
statute may assume undreamed of efficacy in the absence of other
regulatory measures, but even with the enactment of further
laws, the statute should for the purposes of guaranteeing a well-
integrated system of physically connected utility properties, and
a scheme of management service which assures to the public,
rather than to the stockholders, the primary advantages of cen-
tralized management and control, remain the original and basic
cog in the proposed straitjacket. Missouri has taken a step in
the right direction.
STANLEY M. RICHMAN, '33.
41 A note on consolidation, merger and sale setting out a few conditions
that have been imposed in the past may be found in P. U. R. 1918 C, 80. See
also Re Public Utilities Consolidated Corporation (Vt. P. S. C. 1929) P. U. R.
1929 B, 492; Re Empire Telephone Co. (Cal. R. R. C. 1919) P. U. R. 1920 B,
664. The most common may be thus summarized: 1 preservation of future
right of city to purchase; 2 plan of book entries relative to purchase price
be submitted for approval; 3 consolidation must be effectuated through a
corporation organized under the laws of that state.
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